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THE DETERMINATION OF MEDICAL
NECESSITY: MEDICAID FUNDING FOR
SEX-REASSIGNMENT SURGERY
The question of whether the cost of sex-reassignment surgery can be funded
under Medicaid is largely dependent on a determination of the medical necessity of
the procedure. Although the Medicaid statutory scheme places this responsibility on
Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs), reviewing courts often ig-
nore this mandate and instead rely upon the treatingphysician's opinion. This Note
articulates the appropriate statutory approach to the medical necessity determination,
and criticizes thejudiciary's failure to follow the statute. The Note then examines
whether sex-reassignment surgery should receive Medicaidfunding. In view of the
limited sucess of surgery andrecentflndings of success with psychotherapy, the Note
concludes that PSROs shouldfmdthe surgery not medically necessary and thus ineli-
giblefor Medicaid subsidization.
INTRODUCTION
ALTHOUGH ADVANCES in medical technology may solve
complex health problems, they often create equally complex le-
gal problems. For example, the development and availability of
relatively safe abortion procedures have forced courts to weigh a
woman's right to choose what she does with her body against the
state's interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus.' Simi-
larly, legislatures and the judiciary have grappled with the legal
problems which flow from the ability of doctors to change an indi-
vidual's anatomical sex to conform to that individual's psycholog-
ical sex by means of sex-reassignment surgery.2
Though sex-reassignment surgery may be performed legally in
the United States,3 laws governing sexual conduct (sodomy), civil
records, name changes, birth certificates, marriage and divorce,
and employment discrimination all impact upon the life of a
transsexual. The majority of these laws pre-date the advent of
1. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (where the Supreme Court concluded, in its
landmark decision, that a woman's right to privacy includes the right to terminate her
pregnancy up to the second trimester of the gestation period).
2. See text accompanying notes 105-10 infra for a description of the procedure in-
volved in sex-reassignment surgery.
3. The procedure is legal in that it is not prohibited in any jurisdiction. See Note,
The Law and Transsexualism: .4 Faltering Response to a Conceptual Dilemma, 7 CONN. L.
REv. 288 (1975). While the author notes that a surgeon may commit mayhem by perform-
ing the operation, he concludes there is little chance that criminal liability will be imposed.
Id at 295. But see Comment, Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Law, 56
CORNELL L. REV. 962, 979-89 (1971).
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sex-reassignment surgery and have not been revised to meet the
special problems facing the transsexual.4 One specific aspect of
transsexualism to which the law has responded is the cost of sex-
reassignment surgery. Because the operation alone may cost over
$10,000,1 most candidates for the surgery cannot afford the ex-
pense.6 Furthermore, since most of the financially independent
transsexual Americans' operations are performed abroad, the in-
dividuals that desire to undergo the procedure in the United
States are, relatively speaking, financially needy.7 Consequently,
many of these transsexuals turn to the federal Medicaid program
for financial assistance.
The Medicaid program, title XIX of the Social Security Act,
was enacted in 1965 to provide partial federal funding of the costs
of medical services for those "whose income and resources are in-
sufficient to meet the costs" of such services.' While the statutory
scheme empowers the states to decide which medical services will
receive funding under the state's Medicaid program,9 it also limits
their power. States may not restrict coverage of any medical treat-
ment which falls within one of the five mandatory service catego-
ries"° unless the state demonstrates either that the treatment is not
"medically necessary" or that the use of a particular medical pro-
cedure in a specific case is cost inefficient." With regard to sex-
reassignment surgery, the states have relied on the medical neces-
sity prong of this two part exception to deny funding. ' 2
4. One observer has catalogued the law which is in need of revision, including the
criminal law, Note, supra note 3, at 295-98; name change procedures, id at 299-300; re-
issuance of birth certificates, id at 280-310; civil records, id at 310-11; marriage and di-
vorce law, id at 311-24; employment discrimination law, id at 328-32. See also Note,
Transsexuals in Limbo: The Search for a Legal Defnition, 31 MD. L. REV. 236 (1971);
Comment, supra note 3.
5. Morgan, Psychotherapy for Transsexual Candidates Screened Out of Surgery, 7
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 273, 280 (1978).
6. Hastings, Inauguration of a Research Project on Transsexualism in a University
Medical Center, in TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT 243, 246 (R. Green & J.
Money eds. 1969).
7. Id at 247.
8. Social Security Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976)).
9. See notes 20-34 infra and accompanying text.
10. See text accompanying note 27 infra.
1 I. See notes 82-94 infra and accompanying text.
12. States typically deny funding for sex-reassignment surgery by simply classifying
the procedure as a noncovered service in the state Medicaid plan. For example, in Ohio,
the Medicaid Provider's Handbook, an outgrowth of the Ohio State Medicaid Plan, pro-
vides that some medical procedures are not reimbursable or are reimbursable only if cer-
tain prerequisites are met. One such category of procedures is "[closmetic procedures when
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Disputes over funding of sex-reassignment surgery focus
largely on the definitional boundaries of medical necessity.' 3 This
Note contends that the Medicaid statutory scheme places the re-
sponsibility for defining medical necessity and determining which
medical services fit within that definition exclusively in the hands
of Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs). 14 This
Note further contends that once a service is deemed to be medi-
cally necessary by a PSRO, the state may still restrict funding for
that service but may do so only if it can establish the existence of
substantial state fiscal concerns. Such restrictions must be imple-
mented through systematic state PSRO monitoring procedures es-
tablished by federal regulation. 5
PSROs and the courts which review PSRO determinations
must decide whether sex-reassignment surgery is medically neces-
sary. This determination usually settles the issue of subsidization
by Medicaid. Although the courts have addressed the issue of
Medicaid reimbursement for sex-reassignment surgery, they have
done so without considering the impact of the PSRO system on
the state agency's power to establish limitations. This Note dis-
cusses and criticizes the case development, and urges that the
courts reevaluate the Medicaid statutory framework in light of
PSRO authority.16
The Note then analyzes the question of whether sex-reassign-
ment surgery is medically necessary when scrutinized under the
statutory definition of that concept.' 7 An examination of the na-
ture of transsexualism reveals that surgery is not the only avail-
able means of treatment, '8 and that psychotherapy may be a more
efficacious form of treatment. 9 Consequently, the Note concludes
surgery is for aesthetic purposes only. Examples include ...sex change ...." OHIO
DEPT. OF PUBLIC WELFARE MEDICAL HANDBOOK UPDATE, No. 2, § 403 (Dec. 1977).
Although the federal Medicare statute categorically excludes funding for cosmetic sur-
gery, 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(10) (1976), there is no similar exclusion in the Medicaid statu-
tory framework. States have, nevertheless, attempted to exclude procedures from Medicaid
reimbursement by defining them as cosmetic. See, e.g., G.B. v. Lackner, 80 Cal. App. 3d
64, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1978), where the director of the California Board of Health at-
tempted to deny Medicaid benefits to a transsexual who had undergone sex-reassignment
surgery based upon his determination that the surgical procedure was cosmetic.
13. See notes 142-98 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 40-49 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 71-92 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 142-98 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 101-41 infra and accompanying text.
18. See notes 101-31 infra and accompanying text.
19. See notes 118-31 infra and accompanying text.
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that sex-reassignment surgery is not medically necessary and is
therefore not entitled to Medicaid coverage.
I. MEDICAID
A. The Statutory Scheme
Medicaid is a cooperative venture between the state and fed-
eral governments. If a state submits a Medicaid plan which con-
forms to federal statutory requirements, as determined by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (H.H.S.)20 the federal
government will pay up to sixty percent of the cost of medical
services provided under the program.2'
Two groups of individuals are eligible to receive Medicaid
funds: the categorically needy and the medically needy. Categor-
ically needy individuals are persons "receiving aid or assistance
under any plan of the State approved under [subchapters which
set minimum income level requirements for eligibility], or with
respect to whom supplemental security income benefits are being
paid . *"22 The medically needy category, on the other hand,
is comprised of those individuals who are unable to meet the in-
come requirements to qualify for public assistance and yet cannot
afford necessary medical care.23
A person seeking Medicaid benefits must meet the threshold
eligibility requirement under one or both standards before his or
her claims to Medicaid assistance can be considered. Since most
candidates for sex-reassignment surgery cannot afford its cost,
they are likely to be at least medically needy and perhaps even
categorically needy. Thus, initial eligibility is ordinarily not the
transsexual's main concern. The problem arises when the state
determines whether the requested treatment, sex-reassignment
surgery, is within the scope of Medicaid coverage.
There is no single section of title XIX that provides a definitive
resolution of scope of coverage questions. If there were, the char-
acter of the Medicaid program would be fundamentally different.
Rather than being a cooperative undertaking in which both state
and federal concerns are reflected, Medicaid would be simply a
20. The Department of Health and Human Services was created by a reorganization
of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. See Act of Oct. 17, 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-88, § 601, 93 Stat. 696.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1)-(40) (1976). The state pays a minimum of 40%.
22. Id § 1396a(a)(10)(A).
23. Id § 1396a(a)(10)(C).
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federal program administered at the state level. Such was not the
intention of Congress when it drafted title XIX.
Congress intended to reserve a degree of discretion for the
states concerning the type and extent to which certain services will
be covered. In the preamble to title XIX Congress authorized ap-
propriations "[flor the purpose of enabling each state, as far as
practicable under the conditions in such state, to furnish . . .
medical assistance on behalf of. . . individuals, whose income
and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medi-
cal services .. . ."' Thus, the preamble sets forth two criteria
upon which scope of coverage determinations should be made:
services must be practicable under the unique conditions of that
state, and they must be for "necessary medical services." Al-
though the preamble does not specify whether the federal or state
government is to determine the boundaries of "necessary medical
services," it is clearly the state government that is to assess state
conditions.
Section 1396a(a)(17) also demonstrates the congressional in-
tent to give states some discretion over scope of coverage determi-
nations. It requires state plans to "include reasonable standards
. . . for determining the extent of medical assistance under the
plan ... ."25 Furthermore, this section provides that the stan-
dards developed must be consistent with the objectives of title
XIX.26
Notwithstanding this broad language, the states' discretion is
limited; the statute provides certain minimum guidelines that
must be followed. For instance, the statute establishes five catego-
ries of services which are required to be covered. Those services
include inpatient hospital services, outpatient hospital services,
other laboratory and X-ray services, skilled nursing facility serv-
ices, early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment of in-
dividuals under twenty-one, family planning services, and
physicians' services.27 States are further circumscribed in their
discretion with respect to these mandatory categories by the statu-
tory mandate that each service must be sufficiently subsidized in
amount, duration, and scope to achieve its medical or social pur-
pose.28 Finally, and perhaps most importantly for transsexuals, 29
24. Id § 1396.
25. Id § 1396a(a)(17).
26. Id
27. Id § 1396a(a)(13)(B).
28. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) (1979).
CA4SE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [
the Medicaid agency may not deny or reduce the amount, dura-
tion, or scope of a required service solely because of the diagnosis,
type of illness, or condition.3 °
On balance, the statutory scheme limits the states' discretion
with regard to scope of coverage determinations. Nevertheless,
the preamble of the Act3' allows states to limit the scope of Medi-
caid coverage if a service is not medically necessary32 or if a state's
fiscal concerns, as expressed by means of a state monitoring
plan,33 require such limitations.34
B. Medical Necessity
A state's power to limit Medicaid coverage based upon medi-
cal necessity is derived from the statutory provision which states
that payment for health care services will be made only when, and
to the extent that, such services are medically necessary.35  Be-
cause the relevant statutory framework does not define precisely
what is meant by medical necessity, much litigation on the issue
has resulted. 36 The statutory framework does, however, provide
some guidance.37 Even more importantly, the scheme explicitly
provides the mechanism for making medical necessity determina-
tions. 38 Nevertheless, in defining medical necessity, courts have
consistently ignored these statutory directives and have thus un-
necessarily confused the state of the law and have focused prima-
rily on the treating physician's determination in the individual
case.39 Reliance on the physician, however, is misplaced because
29. See notes 169, 191-96 infra and accompanying text.
30. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c)(1) (1979).
3 1. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
32. See notes 35-70 infra and accompanying text.
33. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320c-20(d) (West Supp. 1979). Before the implementation of the
PSRO system, states had the authority to conduct review of the operation of Medicaid
through utilization review, utilization control, and independent professional review (IPR)
activities. Where PSROs have assumed full authority, however, PSRO review performs
these activities. Thus, where a PSRO is in operation, states no longer are responsible for
conducting utilization or IPR activities. 42 C.F.R. § 463.27(a) (1979).
34. See notes 85-92 infra and accompanying text.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976).
36. See, e.g., Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (limiting Medicaid funding to medically
necessary abortions); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (arguably defining medical neces-
sity in the abortion context); D.R. v. Mitchell, 456 F. Supp. 609, 621 (D. Utah 1978) (argu-
ing that Beal v. Doe adopted the Doe v. Bolton definition of medical necessity).
37. See notes 50-60 infra and accompanying text.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4(a)(1)(A) (1976) (defining the duties of Professional Standards
Review Organizations).
39. See notes 142-98 infra and accompanying text.
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the statute unambiguously places the responsibility for making
such a determination on Professional Standards Review Organi-
zations (PSROs).4
By approving care as medically necessary on a case-by-case
basis, PSROs authorize those services to be federally subsidized.
Alternatively, by disapproving care, PSROs bar the federal sub-
sidy.4 Moreover, the statute names the PSRO as the final arbiter
for purposes of determining medical necessity:
[I]t is the purpose of this part to assure, through the application
of suitable procedures of professional standards review, that the
services for which payment may be made under [the Social Se-
curity Act] will conform to appropriate professional standards
for the provision of health care and that payment for such serv-
ices will be made-() only when, and to the extent, medi-
cally necessary ....
The regulations regarding the conclusive effect of PSRO deter-
minations on claims for payment explicitly state that no federal
funds shall be used to subsidize the cost of services if the PSRO
has disapproved of the services giving rise to the claim.43 Signifi-
cantly, the regulations also state that a Medicaid state agency may
not denypayment on the grounds that the services were not medicaly
necessary unless the services at issue have been disapproved by
the PSRO.44
Contrary to the conclusion reached by many courts, 45 determi-
nations of medical necessity made by a treating physician are not
binding upon state agencies reviewing for medical necessity in the
Medicaid context. Indeed, the role of the treating physician in
Medicaid review is narrowly circumscribed by explicit language in
the statute: "No physician shall be permitted to re-
view--(A) health care services provided to a patient if he was
directly responsible for providing such services ...."I
40. A PSRO is a nonprofit professional organization of physicians to which the Secre-
tary of H.H.S. delegates review responsibility. 42 C.F.R. § 462.4(a) (1979). Membership in
a PSRO is voluntary and open to all doctors of medicine and osteopathy, id § 462.4(a)(3),
but at least 25% of all physicians within the area must be members. Id § 462A(a)(4).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c (1976).
42. Id
43. 42 C.F.R. § 463.16(b)(1) (1979).
44. Id § 463.16(c)(1).
45. See note 150 infra and accompanying text.
46. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320c-4(a)(6)(A) (West Supp. 1979). Naturally, physicians make
determinations on the medical necessity of treatments for their patients every day. This
section of title XIX is not intended to inhibit that process in any way; only if a patient seeks
federal Medicaid reimbursement will a PSRO reassess the physician's determination and
only for the purpose of determining Medicaid coverage.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
PSRO review authority is activated at the moment that an in-
dividual patient applies for admission to a hospital or other health
care facility. 7 The evaluation is usuhlly made on a case-by-case
basis, but PSROs are required to develop records based on prior
admissions to identify types of cases eligible for automatic certifi-
cation of admission under the Medicaid program.48 The develop-
ment of this data provides the PSRO with the opportunity to save
considerable time which would otherwise be wasted in making a
detailed review of cases which are consistently found to be medi-
cally necessary. A PSRO may also choose to conduct preadmis-
sion review of the medical necessity of certain types of health care
services.49
The fundamental standard by which a PSRO guides its deci-
sion on medical necessity is the professionally established norm of
care, diagnosis, and treatment.5 0 According to the statute, norms
must take into account differing but acceptable modes of treat-
ment which are considered "within the range of appropriate diag-
nosis and treatment of such illness or health condition, consistent
with professionally recognized and accepted patterns of care."' 5 '
The regulations amplify the norms concept by defining norms as
"numerical or statistical measures of average observed perform-
ance in the delivery of health care services."52
While the statute refers only to norms of treatment, the regula-
tions require PSRO review to be based on norms, criteria, and
standards.53 The regulations define criteria as "predetermined el-
ements of health care, developed by health professionals. . . with
which aspects of the quality, medical necessity, and appropriate-
ness of a health care service may be compared. 54 Standards are
defined as "professionally developed expressions of the range of
acceptable variation from a norm or criterion.
55
Some ambiguity is created by the use in the regulations of fac-
tors which do not appear in the statute. For example, if profes-
sional norms are considered to be merely a "codification of
47. 42 C.F.R. §§ 466.10(a), .11 (1979).
48. Id § 466.15(b)(1).
49. Id § 466.14.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(a) (1976).
51. Id § 1320c-5(b)(1).
52. 42 C.F.R. § 466.2 (1979).
53. Id §466.11(a)(2).
54. Id § 466.2.
55. Id
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existing practice,"56 PSROs would then simply compare a re-
quested form of treatment with this "code" of procedure to deter-
mine whether that treatment was medically necessary. This type
of limited comparison would never analyze the quality of care be-
ing generated by the code.57 Criteria, on the other hand, consist of
a checklist of "state-of-the-art" elements of treatment as deter-
mined by selected medical experts58 and must specify the types of
services which are "most effectively, economically, and appropri-
ately provided at a hospital level of care." 59 The use of criteria
would therefore require the PSRO to perform more than a mere
survey of the current practice of doctors as the reliance on norms
alone suggests. The PSRO would instead compare the requested
treatment with the independently developed "ideal" treatment for
that illness established by the criteria. The use of criteria there-
fore creates the possibility that a PSRO could determine that a
service is not medically necessary even though a survey of general
medical practice might indicate that the service is considered med-
ically necessary.6" Specifically, this result will occur if the average
observed performance of doctors in the community is not in ac-
cordance with what is considered by experts to be ideal perform-
auice.
Applying the evaluative procedure mandated by the regula-
tions-norms, standards, and criteria-a PSRO defines medical
necessity in the following way. The physician recommending hos-
56. A. GOSFIELD, PSROs: THE LAW AND THE HEALTH CONSUMER 36 (1975).
57. The PSRO statute grants conditional immunity to physicians from civil malprac-
tice liability resulting from any actions taken by the physician "in compliance with or reli-
ance upon professionally developed norms of care and treatment .. " applied by a
PSRO. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-16(c) (1976). This immunity is conditioned upon the physician's
adherence to the general standards of care. Id § 1320c-16(c)(2). Because norms are based
upon typical patterns of practice within a PSRO region, they could embody the traditional
tort standard of" care governing the physician-patient relationship. PSRO norms then
might supplant the malpractice standards regarding the choice of treatment procedures
which have been developed through the common law of any particular jurisdiction. How-
ever, because the statutory immunity is conditioned upon the physician's exercising due
care, the malpractice action as an evaluation of medical treatment will not be preempted.
While the failure to follow PSRO standards does not create a legal presumption of
liability, S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 267 (1972), a defendant-physician can rebut
the validity of a PSRO defined standard of care through expert testimony. Note, Profes-
sional Standards Review and the Limitation ofHealth Services: An Interpretation ofthe Ef-
fect oStatutory Immunity on Medical Malpractice Liability, 54 B.U. L. REV. 931, 934-37
(1974); Note, PSRO: Malpvractice Liability and the Impact ofthe Civil lmmunity Clause, 62
GEO. L. 1499, 1505-07 (1974). --
58. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
59. 42 C.F.R. § 466.53(a)(1)(iv) (1979).
60. The reverse is also true.
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pital admission first presents the PSRO with the patient's medical
record, along with the reasons the physician considers admission
for this treatment necessary. The PSRO compares the data
presented by the treating physician with its norms, criteria, and
standards, and then determines whether the treatment requested
for the set of symptoms presented is within the established criteria.
Any quantifiable aspects of the requested treatment, such as the
length of a hospital stay, are determined by the norms for that
treatment. The PSRO might find, for example, that the requested
treatment satisfies the criteria because it is an effective, economi-
cal, and appropriate form of treatment for the patient's
symptomology. The PSRO determines which laboratory tests are
required by the criteria and the total number of days that the
norms indicate are necessary for completion of the treatment. If
the PSRO has developed standards, it would indicate to the physi-
cian the range of acceptable procedures in giving a particular
form of treatment, and perhaps a range of days within which the
treatment should be-completed. If, on the other hand, the norms
and criteria did not indicate the treatment requested for the given
symptomology, the PSRO would deem the treatment to be not
medically necessary and, as a result, the service requested could
not receive federal financial support under Medicaid.6
A medically necessary service in the Medicaid context is there-
fore one which a PSRO determines to be within the range of ap-
propriate treatment presently offered by health professionals for a
particular illness or condition. Norms of care set the boundaries
for that range, but the requested service must also be effective,
economical, and appropriate to satisfy criteria.62 A treating doc-
61. A PSRO determination which results in the denial of Medicaid benefits may be
appealed by the claimant. See text accompanying notes 65-70 infra.
62. A PSRO could deviate from this standard procedure. First, a PSRO could use
variant norms. The statute allows a PSRO to apply a norm which is different from the
regional norm of care if there is a "reasonable basis for usage of other norms in the area
concerned .. " 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(a) (1976). This provision permits the application of
local norms of care for particular services if the PSRO determines that "(I) [t]he patterns of
practice in those locations and hospitals are substantially different from patterns in the
remainder of the PSRO area; and (2) there is a reasonable basis for the difference which
makes the variation appropriate." 42 C.F.R. § 466.50(b)(l)-(2) (1979). The impact of al-
lowing the use of variant norms is that norms may be different from hospital to hospital or
community to community. Nevertheless because norms must still be consulted, PSROs are
not at liberty to accept or deny a service without going through the appropriate procedural
steps.
The second way a PSRO might deviate from this procedure is by arguing that'norms,
criteria, and standards are not the exclusive means by which to judge medical necessity.
The argument would be based upon the statutory language which states that PSROs must
[Vol. 31:179
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tor may not directly participate in the PSRO evaluation of medi-
cal necessity due to the conflict of interest between his on her
PSRO responsibilities and the possible financial benefit which
might flow from the decision.63 The doctor can indirectly influ-
ence the PSRO's ultimate decision, however, by contributing to
the formulation of the general standard of care for the commu-
nity. In addition, the attending physician must be given the op-
portunity to discuss with the PSRO the nature of the patient's
need for health care services, before the PSRO concludes that a
service is not medically necessary.64
If a potential recipient of funds is dissatisfied with a PSRO
determination, he or she may utilize the statutory hearing and re-
view process, 6 which includes a reconsideration of the claim by
the local PSRO.66 If the local PSRO affirms its prior decision, and
the matter in controversy exceeds $100, the individual's request is
entitled to review by the Statewide Professional Standards Review
Council. 7 If the decision of the Statewide Council is adverse to
the claimant, the individual is then entitled to a hearing by the
Secretary of H.H.S.68 Should the claimant still be dissatisfied with
the decision, review by a United States District Court may be ob-
tained where the amount in controversy is $1000 or more.69 Nota-
bly, a state Medicaid agency has no similar right to judicial review
of a medical necessity determination if the PSRO concludes that a
apply norms "as principal points of evaluation and review." 42 U.S.C. § 1320C-5(a) (1976).
Since the statute does not explicitly rule out other methods, a PSRO could argue that it is
free to use any other means it deems appropriate to decide medical necessity. The argu-
ment fails, however, because it compels the conclusion that there are absolutely no federal
or state controls on medical necessity determinations. Such a conclusion directly contra-
dicts the legislative scheme and intent. The extensive regulations which define norms, cri-
teria, and standards would be nugatory in the face of such an assertion. Finally, the
argument also raises the possibility of runaway PSROs, making medical necessity evalua-
tions which are not based upon statutory authority and which are essentially unreviewable.
63. See note 46 supra.
64. 42 C.F.R. § 466.10(e)(l)-(2) (1979).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (1976). This review and appeal process is in lieu of any
other appeals procedure provided by the Social Security Act. Id § 1320c-8(c).
66. Id § 1320c-8(a).
67. Id § 1320c-8(b). The Statewide Council is composed of one representative from
each PSRO in the state, four physicians designated by the state medical society and the
state hospital association, and four persons selected by the Secretary of H.H.S, as represent-
atives of the public. Id § 1320c-l l(b)(l)-(3).
68. Id § 1320c-8(b).
69. Id § 1320c-8(b). The Act further requires that findings of fact by the Secretary, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive in any court proceeding. Id
§ 405(g). The statutory framework reflects the legislative intent to limit the scope of judi-
cial review of the determination of medical necessity.
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claimant is entitled to Medicaid benefits.70
C. State PSRO Monitoring
A state may control the scope of Medicaid coverage on the
basis of the medical necessity of a requested service and the im-
pact on the total state Medicaid expenditure of providing a re-
quested service. 7 Due to the binding effect of PSRO
determinations, however, a state's freedom to shape coverage
boundaries through the medical necessity rationale is severely
limited. Nevertheless, it is evident that Congress intended the
states to retain some degree of control over which services they
will fund. The "as far as practicable" language in the preamble, 72
as well as the authorization to limit the amount, duration, and
scope of services consistent with the objectives of title XIX,7 3 man-
ifest the congressional intention that states' legitimate fiscal con-
cerns be accommodated.
There is, moreover, additional support for the proposition that
Congress intended the states to be able to limit coverage on the
basis of state fiscal concerns. Section 1903(e) of the original Social
Security Act required states to broaden the scope of covered serv-
ices so that all eligible individuals would receive comprehensive
medical care by 1977.74 Congress repealed section 1903(e) in
1972,75 stating that "since 1965. . .health care costs [have risen]
70. The PSRO statutory framework has survived constitutional attack. In Association
of Am. Physicians and Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill.), afI'd, 423 U.S.
975 (1975), the court held that the PSRO legislation did not unconstitutionally interfere
with a physician's right to practice, nor was it arbitrary or lacking in justification, id at 132,
unconstitutionally overbroad, id at 134, an unconstitutional interference with the physi-
cian-patient relationship, id at 135, unconstitutionally vague, id at 138, an unconstitu-
tional imposition of civil liability upon plaintiffs, id at 139, an unconstitutional creation of
presumptions inconsistent with presumptions of competence, good moral character, and
regularity of motive and conduct inherent in medical licensure, id, or an unconstitutional
empowering of biased private organizations to exercise quasi-judicial authority, id at 140.
Additionally, the court held that the PSRO enabling legislation did not infringe upon the
right of privacy of doctors and their patients as guaranteed by the first, fourth, fifth, and
ninth amendments. Id at 137.
71. See notes 35-38 supra and accompanying text.
72. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
73. See notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text.
74. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1903(e), 79 Stat. 286
(originally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(e) (1970)) (repealed 1972). Comprehensive medi-
cal care was defined by H.E.W. to include all goods and services ordered by a physician
within the scope of his or her practice. S. REP. No. 222, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in
[1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1081.
75. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, tit. II, § 230, 86 Stat.
1329 (1972).
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far beyond anything envisaged when section 1903(e) was enacted
[and consequently] the mandatory aspect of that section has cre-
ated an almost fiscally unbearable burden in many States.
76
The original Social Security Act also contained a provision
which prohibited a state from reducing the extent of care and
services provided under its plan if the modification would cause a
reduction in the total state Medicaid expenditure from one year to
the next.77 After expressing concern about the provision's restric-
tive effects on the states' ability to meet fiscal crises,78 Congress
repealed this section of the Act in 1972.79 Consequently, states are
now able to modify the scope and extent of optional services con-
sonant with the state's fiscal policy. 0
The repeal of these sections illustrates congressional awareness
of and concern for state fiscal interests, but, the question remains
as to where the fiscal element enters into scope of coverage deter-
uinations. Because PSROs consider the economic as well as the
medical aspects of the requested treatment,81 state review of
PSRO evaluations necessarily encompasses a review of the eco-
nomic issues. Thus, fiscal concerns are reflected in state PSRO
monitoring procedures.
Section 1320c-20(d)(1) of title XIX authorizes state Medicaid
agencies to monitor the performance of PSROs within the state. 2
If a state chooses to exercise its review capability, it must submit a
state monitoring plan, including the standards which will be used
to evaluate PSRO performance to the Secretary of H.H.S. 83 If the
Secretary approves the plan, the state may begin to evaluate the
effects of PSRO review on the total state Medicaid expenditure
and the appropriateness of care received by individuals seeking
Medicaid benefits." The state may also review the general per-
formance and effectiveness of the PSRO.
76. S. REP. No. 222, supra note 74, at 6, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1077, 1082.
77. Act of Aug. 9, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-56, § 2(d), 83 Stat. 99 (originally codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(d) (1970) (repealed 1972)).
78. H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 100 reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4989, 5086.
79. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, tit. II, § 231, 86 Stat.
1329 (1972).
80. H.R. REp. No. 231, supra note 78, at 100, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4989, 5087.
81. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
82. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320c-20(d)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
83: Id § 1320c-20(d)(1)-(2).
84. Id § 1320c-20(d)(3)(A).
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If the monitoring agency finds any PSRO activity which is in-
effective or which adversely impacts upon appropriateness of care
or total state Medicaid expenditures, it may exercise one of two
options. First, the monitoring agency may choose to meet with
the PSRO to discuss methods for correcting the defect.8 5 If it
elects to hold such a meeting, the monitoring agency must notify
the Secretary of H.H.S. of any serious problems and of the out-
come of the meeting. 6 The Secretary may then decide to take
appropriate action.8 7 The monitoring agency's second option is to
request the Secretary to compel the PSRO to take corrective ac-
tion, or to suspend the PSRO's authority to make conclusive de-
terminations for purposes of payment under Medicaid. 8 Should
the Secretary suspend the PSRO's authority, the PSRO must con-
tinue its review activity, but its determinations will only be advi-
sory to the Medicaid state agency. 9
The second option may be exercised only under narrowly cir-
cumscribed conditions. The state monitoring agency must present
to the Secretary reasonable documentation which shows that the
PSRO has caused "an unreasonable and detrimental impact on
total State expenditures under. . . [Medicaid] and on the appro-
priateness of care received by individuals" under the state's Medi-
caid plan.9" Only when such documentation is produced, and
only when it demonstrates that the detrimental impact has been
caused solely by the PSRO, will the Secretary review the PSRO's
activities.9 Finally, if the Secretary undertakes to review the
PSRO's activities, any action taken to restrict PSRO authority is
final and not subject to judicial review.92
The ability of a state to conduct PSRO monitoring has a
profound impact upon the administration of the Medicaid pro-
gram. Specifically, a state monitoring agency's ability to challenge
PSRO determinations on the basis of fiscal concerns allows states
to limit the scope of Medicaid coverage based on their peculiar
economic conditions.93 Furthermore, because the Secretary can
85. 42 C.F.R. § 463.10(c)(1)(i) (1979).
86. Id § 463.10(c)(1)(ii).
87. Id § 463.10(c)(2). The Secretary could choose to suspend the PSRO's review au-
thority.
88. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320c-20(d)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1979).
89. 42 C.F.R. § 463.10(e)(1)-(2) (1979).
90. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320c-20(d)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1979).
91. 42 C.F.R. § 463.1O(d)(2) (1979).
92. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320c-20(d)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1979).
93. See notes 74-80 supra and accompanying text. The state monitoring agency must
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suspend a PSRO's authority to make conclusive determinations
on medical necessity based upon a state monitoring agency's peti-
tion, a state is not required to fund all procedures deemed medi-
cally necessary by a PSRO. If the Secretary has in fact suspended
the PSRO's authority, a state Medicaid agency faced with a PSRO
decision that a particular service is medically necessary may ig-
nore the PSRO's determination and refuse to fund the service.94
Although the state monitoring provisions give the states the
potential to disregard PSRO decisions under some circumstances,
the same provisions impose a significant limitation on that power.
The Secretary's decision not to suspend a PSRO's authority is not
reviewable in the courts. Thus the states are statutorily barred
from raising their state fiscal concerns in a court action seeking to
overrule a PSRO determination of medical necessity. The Medi-
caid statutory scheme affords judicial review solely to aggrieved
claimants. If a state wishes to limit the scope of Medicaid services
on the basis of fiscal concerns it must pursue the administrative
remedies provided under the state PSRO monitoring provisions.
II. GENDER DYSPHORIA
In order to receive Medicaid funding, a candidate for sex-reas-
signment surgery must first meet the eligibility requirements of
Medicaid.95 If the individual is eligible, the state Medicaid agency
determines whether the surgery falls within the five mandatory
service categories.96 If the treatment is not statutorily excluded,
the PSRO rules on the treatment's medical necessity.97 Only if the
treatment is medically necessary may the state provide funding.
It is at the final stage in this procedure that sex-reassignment
base its objection on both fiscal concerns and the negative impact on the appropriateness of
care. However, if the PSRO has caused a misallocation of resources, some individuals in
the system are arguably not receiving appropriate care because the resources otherwise
available to them are incorrectly being used elsewhere. It seems logical, therefore, that
whenever a state can demonstrate a serious negative impact on state fiscal resources, it can
also demonstrate a corresponding decline in the appropriateness of care received sys-
temwide.
94. The state may also find that the PSRO was correct and that the service was indeed
medically necessary. In either event, neither the statute nor the regulations indicates how
the state is to make the medical necessity determination. Under these circumstances, how-
ever, it is likely that a state would revert back to utilization control or review procedures.
See 42 C.F.R. § 463.10(e)(3) (1979).
95. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
96. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. Sex-reassignment surgery falls within
these requirements.
97. See notes 35-64 supra and accompanying text.
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surgery has been deemed inappropriate. States have argued that
sex-reassignment surgery is not medically necessary and is there-
fore nonreimbursable.9" They have also attempted to justify ex-
clusion of sex-reassignment surgery on the basis of fiscal concerns,
reasoning that the funding of such surgery would have a detri-
mental impact on the state Medicaid budget.99
This Note focuses on the first justification, medical necessity,
by examining the nature of transsexualism (gender dysphoria) and
alternative forms of treatment. It concludes that sex-reassignment
surgery is medically unnecessary and thus that it should not be
federally subsidized by Medicaid.
A. The Nature of Gender Dysphoria
Although psychological definitions of transsexualism differ to
some degree, they are, for the most part, quite similar. A transsex-
ual is a person who expresses an intense desire to be of the oppo-
site sex. Behavior of this type is called gender dysphoria.1°°
Transsexuals claim that they are one sex trapped inside a body of
the opposite sex. They further claim that their intense depression
and suffering can be alleviated only through surgery which trans-
forms their organs to those of the desired sex.1°
Although it may appear from this simple set of descriptive cri-
teria that diagnosing transsexualism is a routine matter, the oppo-
site is true. A patient's request for sex-reassignment surgery, while
providing the necessary evidence of transsexual symptoms, may
not provide sufficient evidence for the actual diagnosis of
transsexualism. 0 2 In fact, such a request might be made by a ho-
mosexual transvestite, a paranoid schizophrenic, or persons suffer-
ing other serious psychological disorders which are not necessarily
98. See Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1980).
99. See Brief for State Appellant at 26-28, Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir.
1980). Although a state may seek to exclude coverage of sex-reassignment surgery because
of its adverse impact upon the state's Medicaid budgdt, it may do so only in accordance
with state PSRO monitoring procedures discussed at notes 71-94 supra and accompanying
text. Thus, because the state appellant in Rush did not raise its fiscal objections in an
administrative hearing before the Secretary of H.H.S. as required by 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1320c-20(d)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1979), it should be precluded from making this argument
before the court.
100. Twardy, Medicolegal Aspects of Transsexualism, 26 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 249
(1980).
101. See generally Lothstein, Psychodynamics and Sociodynamics of Gender Dysphoric
States, 33 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 214, 214-16 (1979).
102. Kirkpatrick & Friedman, Treatment of Requestsfor Sex-Change Surgery with Psy-
chotherapy, 133 AM. J. PSYCH. 1194 (1976).
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incident to transsexualism. Furthermore, because psychotherapy
is an alternative form of treatment, 10 3 applicants must be screened
so that unnecessary surgery is avoided."°4
1. Conventional Treatment: Sex-Reassignment Surgery
If transsexualism is diagnosed, sex-reassignment surgery may
be chosen for its treatment. Sex-reassignment surgery is a highly
complicated, multi-operation procedure. Female-to-male surgery
involves primarily the construction of a penis and a scrotum. l05
The ideal outcome of such surgery is the construction of a penis
which is psychologically, cosmetically, and physiologically satis-
factory. Only the psychological and cosmetic objectives, and the
limited physiological objective of the ability to achieve an erec-
103. The two methods of treatment are also used in combination. See Lothstein, The
Psychological Management and Treatment of Hospitalized Transsexuals, 166 J. NERVOUS &
MENTAL DISEASE 255, 260 (1978).
104. The screening and diagnosis period usually requires a minimum of one year.
During this time, extensive physical and psychiatric testing is performed, and doctors are
given the opportunity to observe the patient over a prolonged period to assess the sincerity
of the patient's desire to undergo the surgery. Most clinics also require that the patient
"cross-dress" and live entirely in the desired sex role for six months to a year. Hastings,
supra note 6, at 248-50.
The diagnostic period is lengthy because of the lack of understanding of the origins, or
etiology, of the disease. In 1971 Dr. Benjamin wrote,
The entire question of etiology... is still open, and so is my own mind about it.
From all available evidence in the field of psychology as well as physiology, I feel
that no one is justified at this time in saying categorically that transsexuals are
made, not born. The opposite may also be true .... [M]ore than one cause is
probably responsible for the transsexual syndrome.
Benjamin, Should Surgery Be Pesformed on Transsexuals?, 25 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 74,
76 (1971). This statement holds true today. Theories on the etiology of transsexualism
indicate that the level of inquiry is still entirely qualitative. No one has yet integrated the
psychological and social factors leading to transsexualism into a unified theory. Conse-
quently, great difficulty is encountered in diagnosis and treatment. H. BENJAMIN, THE
TRANSSEXUAL PHENOMENON (1966); Gilpin, Raza & Gilpin, Transsexual Symptoms in a
Male Child Treated by a Female Therapist, 33 Am. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 453, 455 (1979);
Lothstein, Psychodynamics and Sociodynamics of Gender Dysphoric States, 33 Am. J. PsY-
CHOTHERAPY 214, 216 (1979); MacKenzie, Gender Dysphoria Syndrome: Towards Stan-
dardized.Diagnostic Criteria, 7 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 251 (1978); Money, Hampson
& Hampson, Imprinting and the Establishment of Gender Role, 77 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY
PSYCH. 333 (1957); Morgan, Psychotherapyfor Transsexual Candidates Screened Out of Sur-
gery, 7 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 273, 279 (1978). Socarides, The Desirefor Sexual
Transformation: A Psychiatric Evaluation of "Transsexualism," 125 Am. J. PSYCH. 1419
(1969); Stoller, Parental Influence in Male Transsexualism, in TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX
REASSIGNMENT 153 (R. Green & J. Money eds. 1969).
105. The method used is called the tubed flap method. First employed by Bogoras in
1936, the procedure has been refined by Gillies, Frumkin, and Maltz. Hoopes, Operative
Treatment of the Female Transsexual, in TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT 335,
342 (R. Green & J. Money eds. 1969).
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tion, 0 6 however, are even potentially attainable. °7  Notably, at-
tempting to achieve even these limited objectives may result in
many complications.'
Male-to-female surgery consists of castration and vaginal con-
struction. A variety of methods have been used, involving single-
stage'0 9 and multi-stage' ° procedures. Some patients who have
undergone male-to-female sex-reassignment have attained satis-
factory results after two to eight years of follow-up care."1' The
postsurgical patients then live their lives in their new gender
role. " 12
Not all researchers conducting follow-up studies of sex-reas-
signed individuals report such uniform success. When follow-up
studies first appeared in the literature, most reported excellent re-
sults, but the trend has since reflected more qualified success.' '
3
106. The four physiological objectives of female-to-male sex-reassignment surgery fo-
cus on the role of the penis as a urinary conduit, an instrument of intercourse, a seminal
conduit, and an organ of sensitivity. Noe, Sato, Coleman & Laub, Construction of Male
Genitalia: The Stanford Experience, 7 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 297, 297 (1978).
107. Id at 299. The less than ideal outcome of penis reconstruction is due to the com-
plexity of the surgery. Several stages are required to develop a tube, to migrate it to the
genital area, to construct a urethra, and to add an os penis as needed.
108. Id at 301.
109. Wesser, A Single Stage Operative Techniquefor Castration, Vaginal Construction
and Perineoplasty in Transsexuals, 7 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 309 (1978).
110. Markland & Hastings, Vaginal Reconstruction Using Bowel Segments in Male-to-
Female Transsexual Patients, 7 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 305 (1978). Each of the
methods reported has complications associated with it.
111. Id at 306.
112. Id at 307.
113. One early researcher, who analyzed the postoperative results of surgery performed
on 121 male transsexuals, concluded that a satisfactory outcome of sex-reassignment sur-
gery, in terms of improved social and emotional adjustment, was at least ten times more
likely than an unsatisfactory outcome. Pauly, The Current Status of the Change of Sex
Operation, 147 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 460 (1968). Another early observer re-
ported on 51 reassigned biological males. H. BENJAMIN, THE TRANSSEXUAL PHENOMENON
(1966). He estimated "good" results in 33% (integration into the world of women, accept-
ance by the family, and reasonable sexual adjustment); "satisfactory" results in 53% (less
successful adjustment, although meeting most of the patient's wishes); and "doubtful" re-
sults in 10% (appearance and sexual function unsatisfactory, despite some relief from un-
happiness). Id (discussed in Meyer & Reter, Sex Reassignmen4 36 ARCHIVES GENERAL
PSYCH. 1010, 1010 (1979)).
Randell assessed 29 biological males and six females and reported their postoperative
progress after time periods ranging from three months to several years. Randell, Preopera-
tive and Postoperative Status of Male and Female Transsexuals, in TRANSSEXUALISM AND
SEX REASSIGNMENT 355 (R. Green & J. Money eds. 1969). Five men had shown "psycho-
pathic and antisocial propensities" prior to surgery, and nine had "depressive illness of
varying degrees." Three had postsurgical depressive relapses, and two subsequently com-
mitted suicide. Comparing preoperative and postoperative adjustment of male patients by
means of social and subjective criteria, Randell reported a shift from 86% fair or poor
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One of the most recent studies, conducted by J.K. Meyer and
D.J. Reter of Johns Hopkins University, departed from the usual
practice of reporting on only postsurgical patients and included as
a control group subjects who did not undergo the surgery." 4
They compared the groups in the areas of adaptation (e.g., resi-
dence, education, job), family relationships, adaptational patterns
at major life intervals (e.g., grade school, high school), and fanta-
sies, dreams, and sexual activity. Using the data produced by
these observable behavioral variables, they concluded that appli-
cants for sex-reassignment, whether they undergo surgery or not,
demonstrate improvement over time.I15 They concluded that sex-
reassignment surgery confers no objective advantage in terms of
social rehabilitation, although it remains subjectively satisfying to
those who have rigorously pursued a trial period and who have
undergone it.'16 Significantly, Meyer's conclusion resulted in the
abandonment of sex-reassignment surgery at Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity, the hospital which had initiated the procedure in the
United States.1
1 7
adjustment preoperatively to 72% excellent or good postoperative adjustment. Twenty-two
males were satisfied with surgery, six were dissatisfied, and one wished that the reassign-
ment could be reversed. The six females received androgens and subsequently underwent
numerous surgical procedures. Results were judged to be excellent in three, good in two,
and fair in one. Id at 355-82.
Money's research focused on the case histories of 24 postoperative subjects. Money &
Ehrhardt, Transsexuelle nach Geschlechtswechsel, in TENDENZEN DER SEXUALFORSCHUNG
70 (G. Schmidt, E. Schorsch & V. Sigusch eds. 1970), cited in Comment, supra note 3, at
977. To measure the success of surgery, he examined the patients' expressed satisfaction
with the surgery, employment status, police records, psychiatric records, and sexual rela-
tionships. All but one unequivocally expressed the feeling of having done the right thing in
undergoing reassignment. Nine males improved in employment status and eight remained
the same; three females improved in employment status while four remained the same; six
of the males had been arrested prior to surgery and two were arrested again postsurgically;
none became psychotic, and all showed stability in sexual partnerships.
According to a follow-up study of 25 reassigned males conducted by Hastings, postop-
erative adjustment averaged between good and fair. Hastings, PostsurgicalAdjustments of
Male Transsexual Patients, I CLINICS PLASTIC SURGERY 335, 335-44 (1974). Adjustment
was rated on a four-point scale (from poor to excellent) in each of four major categories:
economic, social, sexual, and emotional. Although no patients with known histories of
overt mental illness were accepted into the program, two psychotic episodes occurred post-
operatively and four patients made serious suicide attempts.
114. Meyer & Reter, supra note 113.
115. Id at 1015.
116. Id Meyer has also expressed his personal opinion on the subject: "[Slurgery is
not a proper treatment for a psychiatric disorder, and it's clear to me that these patients
have severe psychological problems that don't go away following surgery." N.Y. Times,
Oct. 2, 1979, § C (Science Times), at 1, col. 1.
117. Id Precisely what precipitated the abandonment of sex-reassignment surgery at
Johns Hopkins is open to some speculation. It has been suggested, however, that the deci-
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2. Alternative Treatment- Psychotherapy
Not until recently has psychotherapy been recognized as a po-
tentially successful alternative treatment for transsexualism. In
1973, Dr. Brent reflected the view of a majority of his profession
when he stated: "The alternative to surgical rehabilitation is rele-
gation to a life of frustration and despair or suicide.""' Similarly,
Dr. Pauly observed in 1968: "Psychotherapy has not proved help-
ful in allowing the transsexual to accept that gender identity
which is consistent with his [sic] genital anatomy."'" 9
Since Dr. Pauly's subsequent assertion in 1969 that there were
no reported cases in which psychotherapy had been used success-
fully, 20 such cases have begun to appear in the literature. In 1979
Dr. Lothstein of Case Western Reserve University Medical School
reported successful psychotherapy with transsexuals.' 21 He noted
that although the variety of group formats makes evaluation and
comparison difficult, the success of his group therapy approach
"refutes the idea that psychotherapy is useless with gender
dysphoric patients."' 22
Psychotherapy is not, however, a treatment without problems.
Lothstein reports that gender dysphoric patients often equate psy-
chotherapy with a refusal of surgery.123 Consequently, the patient
views the therapist as a dangerous figure who must be de-
stroyed.124 Lothstein, however, has surmounted these initial diffi-
culties. He reports that
sion was political rather than scientific. See Lothstein, The Post-Surgical Transsexual- Em-
pirical and Theoretical Considerations, to be published in ARCHIVES SExuAL BEHAVIOR
(Summer 1980).
While agreeing with Dr. Meyer's conclusion that sex-reassignment is palliative and not
rehabilitative, Dr. Paul A. Walker, director of the University of Texas gender clinic in
Galveston, opined that the surgery should be performed anyway. 20 MEDICAL WORLD
NEWS 17, 19 (Sept. 17, 1979). Dr. Chester W. Schmidt, chief of psychiatry at Baltimore
City Hospital, defends Dr. Meyer's findings, pointing out that the study appeared in the
Archives of General Psychiatry, which is published by the American Medical Association.
The appearance of the study there, Schmidt asserts, indicates the A.M.A.'s approval of the
study's conclusion. Id
118. Brent, Some Legal Problems of the Postoperative Transsexual, 12 J. FAM. L. 405
(1972-73).
119. Pauly, supra note 113, at 465.
120. Pauly, Adult Manifestations ofMale Transsexualism in TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX
REASSIGNMENT 37, 48 (R. Green & J. Money eds. 1969).
121. Lothstein, Group Therapy with Gender Dysphoric Patients, 33 AM. J. PSYCHOTHER-
APY 67 (1979).
122. Id
123. Id at 77.
124. Id at 78.
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[t]wo male-to-female patients who were compulsively driven to
seek sex reassignment surgery, discovered in group meeting
that their problems were psychological and left the gender pro-
gram. Another male-to-female patient was considered an ex-
cellent surgical candidate, but after two years of group therapy,
he began to experience intense ambivalence and put off sched-
uling his surgery. Another patient left the group after a brief
period after realizing he wished to continue in a homosexual
transvestite role.' 2'
Similarly, Gilpin, Raza, and Gilpin reported that a disturbed six-
year-old boy with transsexual symptoms was successfully treated
by a female psychotherapist. 126 It was noted by the researchers
that success may depend on the youth of the subject.1 27
Many recent studies have attacked the justifications for sex-
reassignment surgery and have supported psychotherapy not only
as an alternative but as the preferred treatment. 28 In his recent
follow-up study, Lothstein reports that sex-reassigned individuals
show moderate to severe psychological dysfunction.1 29 In addi-
tion, he suggests that major issues, such as the patient's organiza-
tion, synthesis, and integration of the new gender identity, as well
as problems associated with social perceptions, are not and cannot
be resolved through sex-reassignment surgery.1 30 He concludes
that the problems of the postoperative patient are rooted in psy-
chological dysfunctions which cannot be remedied by sex-reas-
signment surgery, and that psychotherapy may provide the only
mechanism for treating most transsexuals.131
B. Sex-Reassignment Surgery is Medically Unnecessary
Medical necessity in the Medicaid context is defined in terms
125. Id at 79 (emphasis omitted).
126. Gilpin, Raza & Gilpin, supra note 104.
127. Id at 461-62.
128. Barlow, Abel & Blanchard, Gender Identity Change in a Transsexual, 36 ARCHIVES
GENERAL PSYCH. 1001 (1979); Eber, Transsexualsn" A Critique of a Theory, in Lothstein,
supra note 117.
129. Lothstein, supra note 117.
130. Id
131. Id; see also Lothstein, Expressive Psychotherapy with Gender Dysphoric Patients,
to be published in ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAVIOR (Summer 1980). Contra, Phillips v.
Plotkin, 12 Pa. D. & C. 3d 54 (1979), where a male transsexual petitioned the court to
compel his wife to support him during their separation prior to divorce. His wife had
refused support due to several violent acts inflicted upon her by her husband which she
claimed forced her departure from their home. The court, in deciding that the wife was
justified in leaving the home and refusing support, held that the prevailing viewpoint was
that transsexuals are psychologically healthy individuals, and that therefore the husband's
acts were not compelled by his condition. Id at 2259-60.
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of norms, criteria, and standards.132 In order for a requested
treatment to meet the established criteria, it must be both effective
and appropriate.13 3 The studies by both Meyer and Lothstein in-
dicate, however, that sex-reassignment surgery is neither effective
nor appropriate. 134 The Meyer study expresses serious doubt that
the sex-reassigned individual will adjust, psychologically or so-
cially, any better than an individual who does not undergo the
surgery;135 Lothstein adds that the major psychological problems
which cause gender dysphoria are not resolved through sex-reas-
signment surgery. 36 Moreover, the frequency of complications
after the surgery also supports the conclusion that the surgical
procedure is both ineffective and inappropriate for the treatment
of gender dysphoria.137
Psychotherapy, though dismissed as a valid technique ten
years ago, has recently been demonstrated to be quite effective in
the treatment of gender dysphoria.138 Not only has it proved val-
uable as a rehabilitative tool, but it has also been shown to be
capable of curing transsexual behavior. Finally, psychotherapy
does not carry the inherent risks associated with hormone treat-
ment and surgery, such as cancer, infection, or anesthetic compli-
cations.
In light of its apparent success and lack of attendant adverse
side effects, psychotherapy should be the preferred treatment for
gender dysphoria. Sex-reassignment surgery should, therefore, be
deemed medically unnecessary, a determination which bars Medi-
caid reimbursement. 139
A transsexual claimant under Medicaid could appeal a
PSRO's determination that sex-reassignment surgery is not medi-
cally necessary. If the decisions of the Statewide PSRO and the
Secretary of H.H.S. were adverse to the claimant, the issue could
then be litigated in federal court. For the court to rule in favor of
the claimant, it would have to find that the Secretary's determina-
tion was not supported by substantial evidence."4 Given the data
132. See notes 53-62 supra and accompanying text.
133. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
134. See notes 116, 128-31 supra and accompanying text.
135. See notes 114-15 supra and accompanying text.
136. See notes 129-30 supra and accompanying text.
137. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
138. See notes 118-31 supra and accompanying text.
139. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
140. See note 69 supra.
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reported above, it seems unlikely that a court would make that
determination.
Though federal courts have ruled on medical necessity issues
in the Medicaid context, they have not done so with reference to
norms, standards, and criteria. Rather, the courts have inexplica-
bly ignored these statutory guidelines which define medical neces-
sity. A review of the incongruous decisions which have resulted
illuminates the desirability of the statutory approach suggested
above. 141
III. COURT DECISIONS
The courts of appeal are split on the question of whether
Medicaid funding should subsidize sex-reassignment surgery. In
Rush v. Parham,142 an anatomical male who had been diagnosed
as a transsexual by her physician sought Medicaid reimbursement
from the Georgia Department of Medical Assistance for the cost
of sex-reassignment surgery.'43 The Department rescinded its ini-
tial approval, stating that the surgery was not covered because it
was experimental. 1" Rush requested reconsideration and sup-
ported her request with affidavits from two experts.145 Although
the affidavits stated that Rush was a true transsexual and that sex-
reassignment surgery was the only effective means of treatment, 146
the Department again rejected Rush's claim, this time basing its
decision upon the newly amended state Medicaid plan which spe-
cifically excluded experimental surgery.147 Rush sought injunc-
tive relief in the district court, alleging that Georgia's refusal to
pay for the surgery violated the federal statutory requirement that
141. One commentator has asserted that the Supreme Court has preemptively defined
"medical necessity" and that this definition should be determinative in all future Medicaid
litigation. Note, State Restrictions on Medicaid Coverage of Medically Necessary Services,
78 COLUM. L. REv. 1491, 1496-98 (1978). Contra, Butler, The Right to Medicaid Payment
for.Abortion, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 931, 953-61 (1977).
In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973), the Supreme Court noted five factors which
it considered to be relevant in evaluating a physician's decision regarding the necessity of
an abortion: "physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age." This list
of factors has been advanced as the Bolton definition of medical necessity. Even if this
definition controls, sex-reassignment surgery would remain medically unnecessary because
it cannot relieve the psychological distress experienced by the transsexual. See notes
129-31 supra and accompanying text.
142. Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1980).
143. Id at 1152.




CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
a state Medicaid program pay for all medically necessary serv-
ices. 148
In granting the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, 49
the district court held that Georgia's Medicaid program must pay
for all medically necessary services, and that the state must not
interfere with the determination of medical necessity made by the
attending physicians.1 50  The court of appeals reversed, stating
that
a state may adopt a definition of medical necessity that places
reasonable limits on a physician's discretion. One such limita-
tion is the one Georgia contends it used in denying the surgery:
a ban against reimbursement for experimental forms of treat-
ment, i.e., not generally recognized as effective by the medical
profession.' 5 '
The court further stated that it is within a state Medicaid agency's
power to review on a case-by-case basis the medical necessity of
prescribed treatment. 152
Significantly, the court did not hold that the state Medicaid
agency must provide funding for all services deemed by a treating
physician to be medically necessary.153 It held, instead, that it is
the state's responsibility to define medical necessity in a manner
consistent with "the requirements of its own Medicaid pro-
gram"-a definition that may differ from that used by the pa-
tient's attending physician.' 54
148. Rush v. Parham, 440 F. Supp. 383, 385 (N.D. Ga. 1977), rev'd, 625 F.2d 1150 (5th
Cir. 1980). Rush sought injunctive relief to prevent the state from enforcing the ban on
payment for experimental surgery.
149. Rush moved for summary judgment on the basis that there was no issue of mate-
rial fact on the two questions before the court: (1) whether a state Medicaid program could
categorically deny funding of a service which two physicians had stated was medically
necessary, and (2) whether the Department of Medical Assistance had abused its discretion
in finding that the surgery was not required in this instance. Id at 388.
150. Id at 390.
151. 625 F.2d at 1150.
152. Id at 1155.
153. In Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980), the Supreme Court also sidestepped
the issue of whether Medicaid must provide funding for all medically necessary services. It
held that states could refuse to provide Medicaid reimbursement for services from which
Congress has specifically withdrawn federal financial support. Id at 2684. Thus, states
can constitutionally deny funding for medically necessary abortions.
154. 625 F.2d at 1155. By implication, state fiscal concerns may enter into the formual-
tion of the definition.
The court in Rush believed that the standards used by states in defining medical neces-
sity should be analogous to those used in the Medicare program. Id at 1156. It quoted
from a Medicare letter which stated that "a basic consideration is whether the seriice has
come to be generally accepted by the professional medical community as an effective and
proven treatment for the condition for which it is being used." Id The court directed the
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Perhaps the most critical fault in the Rush court's analysis was
the failure to consider the impact of the PSRO legislation. As a
result, even after the court properly found that states do have dis-
cretion over what services must be covered, it struggled with the
questions of who within the state should create the definition of
medical necessity and what standards are to be applied in formu-
lating that definition. The PSRO legislation unambiguously states
that PSROs decide medical necessity, and that the definition is to
be based upon norms of care as defined by the statute and the
regulations. The court, however, without the guidance of section
1320c, 155 stated that the standard of review for an attending physi-
cian's diagnosis is whether the diagnosis was "without any basis in
fact."' 56 In so deciding, the court ignored the statutory command
that an attending physician not be permitted to participate directly
in the medical necessity determination for purposes of Medicaid
reimbursement.1 57 The court also created a presumption in favor
of the attending physician's determination in contradiction of the
PSRO legislation which provides that the attending physician's
determination is only advisory to the PSRO.'58
In an attempt to find statutory guidance for the formulation of
the definition of medical necessity, the court looked to the Medi-
care program. This choice, however, was an unfortunate one.
There are thirteen types of services which are statutorily excluded
from coverage under Medicare,159 one of which is cosmetic sur-
gery.160 There are no such categorical exclusions in the Medicaid
statutory framework. Instead, Congress implemented a compre-
hensive system for making such determinations on a case-by-case
basis and delegated decisionmaking authority and responsibility
to PSROs. Thus, by using Medicare standards to formulate simi-
lar standards under Medicaid, the court circumvented the entire
scheme which Congress established for making medical necessity
determinations under Medicaid.1 61
district court on remand to determine "(1) whether Georgia, in fact, had a policy prohibit-
ing payment for experimental services when it first rejected plaintiff's application; and, if it
did, (2) whether its determination that transsexual surgery is experimental was reasonable."
Id
155. See notes 42-46 supra and accompanying text.
156. 625 F.2d at 1157.
157. See notes 46 supra and accompanying text.
158. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)-(13) (1976).
160. Id § 1395y(a)(10).
161.' See notes 35-94 supra and accompanying text. On remand, the district court
should find that it has no jurisdiction to decide whether Georgia's characterization of sex-
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The only other court of appeals which has ruled on Medicaid
funding for sex-reassignment surgery reached a contrary result.
In Pinneke v. Preisser,62 the county office of the Iowa Department
of Social Services refused to fund the sex-reassignment surgery of
an eligible applicant.163 Because the Iowa State Medicaid Plan
had established an irrebuttable presumption that treatment of
transsexualism by alteration of healthy tissue was not "medically
necessary," the Commissioner of the Department affirmed the de-
cision.'" The District Court for the Northern District of Iowa,
however, reversed the Commissioner's decision, holding that the
denial of Medicaid benefits for sex-reassignment surgery was con-
trary to the provisions of title XIX of the Social Security Act and
therefore in violation of the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution.16 The court declared the relevant parts of the Iowa
State Plan void and permanently enjoined the Iowa Medicaid pro-
gram from refusing to fund the surgery. 166
In affirming the decision of the district court, 67 the court of
appeals relied on four findings. First, the court accepted medical
testimony and documentary evidence showing that sex-reassign-
ment surgery is the only medical treatment available to relieve or
solve the problem of a true transsexual. 6 Second, the court
found that "a state plan absolutely excluding the only available
treatment known at this stage of the art for a particular condition
must be considered an arbitrary denial of benefits based solely on
the 'diagnosis, type of illness, or . . . condition.' ",169 Third, the
court concluded that Iowa's policy was inconsistent with the
objectives of the Medicaid statute because it established an ir-
rebuttable presumption that sex-reassignment surgery was not
medically necessary without any formal rulemaking proceedings
or hearings.170 The court also stated that the Medicaid statute re-
quired "medical judgments to play a primary role in the determi-
reassignment surgery as experimental is reasonable because that decision must first be
made by a PSRO. Not until Rush has taken the claim through the administrative hearing
and review process established by statute will the district court have jurisdiction. See notes
65-70 supra and accompanying text.
162. 623 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980).
163. Id at 547.
164. Id at 548, 550.
165. Id at 547.
166. Id
167. Id
168. Id at 548.
169. Id at 549.
170. Id
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nation of medical necessity,"'' and particularly the judgments of
the applicant's treating physician.'" 2 Finally, the court's finding
that transsexual surgery falls within the medical assistance catego-
ries of "inpatient hospital services" and "physicians' services fur-
nished by a physician,"' 7 3 enabled it to conclude that the surgery
must be covered under the state's Medicaid plan unless not medi-
cally necessary.'7
4
While the court in Pinneke properly objected to the Iowa De-
partment of Social Services' failure to conduct formal rulemaking
proceedings or hearings on the medical necessity issue, it erred in
deciding to make its own rule that sex-reassignment surgery is
medically necessary. The court should have dismissed the action,
instructing the parties to seek a PSRO determination and then, if
dissatisfied, to follow the review procedure mandated by the fed-
eral regulations. 17  In addition, the court ignored the statutory
language defining and limiting the role of the attending physi-
cian, 176 and instead quoted from the legislative history of the 1965
Social Security Amendments to support its conclusion that the ap-
plicant's attending physician should have controlling authority in
medical necessity determinations. 177 The provision quoted by the
court, however, had been completely superseded by the PSRO
legislation. Even in 1965 when the amendments were under con-
sideration the quoted portion of the legislative history was to be
considered only in view of the function of utilization review com-
mittees whose decisions were to supersede the medical necessity
evaluations of attending physicians in disputed cases.' 78 Finally,
the court incorrectly concluded that sex-reassignment surgery is
171. Id
172. Id To support its conclusion, the court quoted a portion of the legislative history
of title XIX:
The committee's bill provides that the physician is to be the key figure in
determining utilization of health services-and provides that it is a physician who
is to decide upon admission to a hospital, order tests, drugs and treatments, and
determine the length of stay. For this reason the bill would require that payment
could be made only if a physician certifies to the medical necessity of the services
furnished.
S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 46, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1943, 1986.
173. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
174. 623 F.2d at 549.
175. See notes 65-70 supra and accompanying text.
176. See notes 46 & 64 supra and accompanying text.
177. See note 172 supra and accompanying text.
178. S. REP. No. 404, supra note 172, at 46, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 1987-88.
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the only available treatment for transsexualism. Not only are
other forms of treatment available, but they have been found to be
more effective than the surgical procedure. 7 9
In two California cases decided after Rush, but before Pinneke,
GB. v. Lackner10 and JD. v. Lackner,'' the plaintiff transsexu-
als appealed from the Director of the California Department of
Health's determintion that Medi-Cal does not cover transsexual
surgery. In a written opinion, the Director had stated that the sur-
gery was solely for cosmetic purposes and had overruled a De-
partment of Health referee's order that the surgery should be
funded.' 82 A Medi-Cal bulletin also stated that funding for
transsexual surgery was unavailable. 83 After hearing testimony
from plaintiffs' physicians that the surgery was necessary, and fur-
ther testimony from a doctor representing the Gender Identity
Clinic at Johns Hopkins University to the effect that psychother-
apy "has not so far solved the problem," the court held that the
surgery was not cosmetic.18 4
It is unclear from the Lackner decisions precisely who had
written the Medi-Cal bulletin denying funding for sex-reassign-
ment surgery. Assuming that the decision was made by an appro-
priate PSRO, the claimants were entitled to review of that
decision by a Statewide Council, by the Secretary of H.H.S., and,
finally, by the courts. Apparently that procedure was not followed
since state officials of the Medi-Cal program were hearing the ap-
peals. Therefore, the procedure failed to conform to federal regu-
lations prescribing review of medical necessity decisions. The
decision is flawed because a court should only be called upon to
formulate definitions of medical necessity after appropriate ad-
ministrative hearings considering PSRO judgments.
In Denise A v. Lavine,' s5 the petitioner transsexual was denied
funding for his sex-reassignment surgery by the New York City
Department of Social Services. 86 After a hearing at which the
State Commissioner of Social Services affirmed the denial," 7
179. See notes 121-31 supra and accompanying text.
180. 80 Cal. App. 3d 64, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1978).
181. 80 Cal. App. 3d 90, 145 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1978).
182. 80 Cal. App. 3d at 66, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 556; 80 Cal. App. 3d at 94, 145 Cal. Rptr.
at 572.
183. Id. at 66-67, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 556; 80 Cal. App. 3d at 94, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
184. Id. at 71, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 559; 80 Cal. App. 3d at 95, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
185. 39 N.Y.2d 279, 347 N.E.2d 893, 383 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1976).
186. Id at 282, 347 N.E.2d at 895, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 570.
187. Id, 347 N.E.2d at 895, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 570.
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court action was instituted for review of the Commissioner's deci-
sion. The Special Term denied the funding, the Appellate Divi-
sion reversed, 18 and the New York Court of Appeals reinstated
the Commissioner's ruling denying funding.'8 9 The court rea-
soned that the determination was beyond judicial competence and
concluded that "where an administrator adopts one of several
conflicting opinions, it is not the province of the Court to substi-
tute its judgment unless the agency's determination is unreasona-
ble or without a basis in law."' 190 The precedential value of this
case is, however, limited. When petitioner first requested funding
in 1972, the PSRO statute had not been enacted. Thus, whether
the procedures conformed to 1972 statutory guidelines is of no
consequence today.
In Doe v. Department of Public Welfare, 9' the Supreme Court
of Minnesota ordered the Department of Public Welfare to pro-
vide Medicaid funding for the plaintiff's sex-reassignment surgery.
The court began its analysis by looking to the regulations imple-
menting title XIX. By focusing on the proscription against the
limitation of funding solely because of the diagnosis, type of ill-
ness, or condition, the court held that the state's categorical denial
of transsexual surgery was void.'92 Furthermore, because the state
could offer no rationale as to why transsexual surgery was the only
type of surgical treatment which, if recommended by a physician,
was not covered by the program, 193 the exclusion was held to be
arbitrary.' 94 The court also invalidated the state welfare depart-
ment's definition of medical necessity which included the require-
ment that the surgery must eliminate the patient's disability and
render him financially self-supporting.'95 Finally, the court or-
dered all future cases of this type to be reviewed for medical ne-
cessity on a case-by-case basis by a "thorough, complete, and
unbiased medical evaluation" conducted by the appropriate state
agency.'
96
The Doe court properly applied parts of the statute. The state
agency's initial denial of funding for the surgery clearly violated
188. Id, 347 N.E.2d at 895, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 570.
189. Id at 283, 347 N.E.2d at 895, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 570.
190. Id, 347 N.E.2d at 895, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 570 (citations omitted).
191. 257 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1977).
192. Id at 820.
193. Id
194. Id at 821.
195. Id at 820-21.
196. Id at 820.
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the regulations, which permit state limitation on scope of coverage
only on the basis of medical necessity or fiscal concerns.1 97 In ad-
dition, the medical necessity definition which was invalidated by
the court violated statutory guidelines on norms of care. Cer-
tainly, the act of receiving welfare is not a valid measure of medi-
cal infirmity; in fact, receiving public assistance is a criterion of
eligibility for Medicaid.' Finally, the court in Doe expressed a
willingness to defer to another decisionmaker on the question of
medical necessity. Although the court did not name the PSRO as
that decisionmaker, review of that type was at least envisioned.
IV. CONCLUSION
Recent scientific investigation has called into question the
medical necessity of sex-reassignment surgery. PSRO determina-
tions and the resulting scope of coverage decisions should neces-
sarily reflect this new awareness. For this to occur, however, state
Medicaid agencies and courts must follow the statutory guidelines
governing the formulation and review of medical necessity deci-
sions.
Thus far, the courts have not relied upon the PSROs' ability to
respond to the medical community's changing opinion on the ne-
cessity of sex-reassignment surgery. Rather, courts have at-
tempted to formulate a definition themselves for medical necessity
in this context. This usurpation of PSRO power is unfortunate
because the PSRO system allows courts to effectuate their often
expressed desire to leave medical decisions to doctors.' 99 On the
other hand, the PSRO system cannot be effective unless the states
comply with the relevant regulations. State plans which do not
provide for PSROs should be rejected and federal funding should
be cut off. Otherwise, unnecessary litigation in federal courts will
follow and the credibility of the Medicaid program will be se-
verely undermined.
Finally, by concluding that sex-reassignment surgery is medi-
cally necessary, courts have contributed to an overemphasis in the
medical community on this surgical procedure and a concurrent
underemphasis on psychotherapy. Consequently, the transsexual
community is being served poorly. Transsexuals are often chan-
197. See 42 C.F.R. §440.230(b) (1979) (cited by the court as 45 C.F.R. § 249.10
(1976)).
198. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
199. See, eg., Rush v. Parham, 440 F. Supp. at 390.
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neled into a surgical procedure of arguably limited value. More-
over, the relatively low demand for psychotherapy may explain
the correspondingly low number of psychotherapists competent to
administer the treatment. Perhaps if the Medicaid program were
to recognize the limitations of sex-reassignment surgery, more
psychotherapists would be willing to provide this alternative treat-
ment, and more transsexuals would be able to benefit from it.
SETH A. JACOBS

